Abstract-Recently, physical layer security in the optical layer has gained significant traction. Security threats in optical networks generally impact the reliability of optical transmission. Linear Network Coding (LNC) can protect from both the security threats in form of eavesdropping and faulty transmission due to jamming. LNC can mix original data to become incomprehensible for an attacker and also extend original data by coding redundancy, thus protecting a data from errors injected via jamming attacks. In this paper, we study the effectiveness of LNC to balance reliable transmission and security in optical networks. To this end, we combine the coding process with data flow parallelization of the source and propose and compare optimal and randomized path selection methods for parallel transmission. The study shows that a combination of flow parallelization, LNC and randomization of path selection increases security and reliability of the transmission. We analyze the so-called catastrophic security threat of the network and show that in case of conventional transmission scheme and in absence of LNC, an attacker could eavesdrop or disrupt a whole secret data by accessing only one edge in a network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, physical layer security in the optical layer has gained significant traction. Security threats in optical networks generally impact the reliability of optical transmission. In the case of fiber cut and tapping attacks, an attacker has physical access to network equipment and can disrupt the connection. The interchannel eavesdropping and jamming, on the other hand, can be lunched from a legitimately acquired optical channel [1] . In addition, an attacker can exploit the crosstalk effects and launch both jamming and eavesdropping attacks. For a jamming attack, the attacker injects a high-power jamming signal (5 − 10 dB above other, legitimate signals) into the acquired lightpath inducing a severe interference effect for transmission channel on the fiber link, thus degrading the signal quality. At the same time, the attacker can collect the leakage signals from adjacent lightpaths and extracts the secret information by amplifying the collected signals [2] .
A number of effective solutions against jamming and eavesdropping attacks propose encryption and optimization of lightpath disjointness; encryptions can effectively protect against eavesdropping, and path disjointness can make eavesdropping more difficult. However, the currently proposed methods do not consider the case where the information is partially distorted, be it purposely or as a side effect of an attack. One of the prospective methods to address this includes the Linear Network Coding (LNC). LNC can protect from both the jamming and eavesdropping, while addressing the issue of fault tolerance due to optical physical impairments [3] . With LNC, the source combines the original data with random information and designs a network code that only the receivers are able to decode. The nodes can only decode packets if they have received a sufficient number of linearly independent information vectors, which an eavesdropper might not be able to do. Second, LNC is also an erasure coding technique and thus can protect the source message also from random errors, and errors injected by the wiretapper via jamming attacks, which is significant in optical networks due to impairments [4] - [6] . LNC can provide the so-called r-secure coding, whereby a wiretapper can eavesdrop any r channels in the network, without gaining any knowledge about the source message.
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of LNC to balance the demands of reliable 1 transmission and security in optical networks. To this end, we combine the coding process with parallelization of the source data stream, matching the generation size to the number of paths allocated in the optical network. In our approach, a serial data stream from the source is parallelized into n = k + r lightpaths, whereby k represents number of data blocks of the original (secret) data and r is a number of redundancies (random data sources) generated at the source to protect a secret data against wiretap security attacks. In addition, we study how the path selection in the optical layer impacts the security overall. Specifically, we study two path selection methods in circuit switched (WDM) transmission networks: 1) optimized paths, and 2) arbitrarily available paths. The results show that LNC and a random path selection method can effectively balance and improve both the security and reliability of optical transmission. This is significant, since random path selection is only possible due to LNC, which in absence of suboptimal paths, can compensate for any physical layer impairments which otherwise would impede the quality of optical paths. Fig. 1 shows our reference network model. The data traffic is modeled as a binary sequence, whereby original data can be decomposed into M data blocks of the same length. Every data block is then parallelized and distributed in a round robin fashion to k sub-flows at the source nodes. This is akin to the high speed Ethernet systems with Multiple Lane Distribution (MLD) [7] . For instance, in an MLD Ethernet network an incoming serial flow consists of multiple 66b data blocks 1 We refer to reliable or fault-tolerant transmission as transmission where physical impairments resulting in packet losses are permissible but do not impact the reception and quality of optical transmission. Fiber breaks are out of scope in this paper, and require separate and different consideration. Without loss of generality, and for simplicity, Fig. 1 illustrates how LNC is performed at the end-system, i.e., at source and destination, and the assumption is that there is no coding in the middle of the network 2 . The linear coding process is performed over a field F 2 m , where 2 m is the field size. Here, each data block is decomposed into symbols, whereby each symbol has the same length of m bits. Symbols encoded with the same set of coding coefficients are referred to as a generation, while the number of original information symbols k encoded with the same set of coding coefficients defines the generation size. Here, new coding coefficients are utilized for each new set of data blocks from k parallel sub-flows. Thus, the source data of M data blocks result in M k generations. After the encoding, we assume that the number of outgoing encoded flows n, corresponding to the number of required optical paths ξ over optical network, i.e., n = ξ. In other words, the source sends the encoded data over ξ out of all N available paths in the network. Note that, the number of outgoing encoded flows n can be equal to or larger than number of incoming flows k, n ≥ k, which is a coding feature specially important for path selection, security and reliable transmission. When more packets are encoded in parallel and more paths are chosen that the number of parallel lanes (e.g., in the Ethernet parlance), we refer to r = n − k additional symbols sent and paths chosen as redundancy. With redundancy, reliable transmission of one generation is straightforward when k out of n = k + r arbitrary encoded symbols/data blocks from the same generation from any of n paths chosen are received, which implies that a fully successful decoding at the receiver is possible. This feature provides protection against jamming attacks as well as any physical impairments, when an attacker disrupt only ν ≤ r data blocks from each generation. At the same time, since allows for additional physical impairment in optical networks (be it due to attacks, or for the quality of transmission of the path chosen), which can be effectively compensated with LNC, paths can be sub-optimal or even randomly chosen [3] . Also, eavesdropping attacks can be successfully defeated by LNC due to the fact that a wiretapper requires at least k encoded data blocks from the same generation as well as the knowledge about coding coefficients to recover secret data.
II. MODELING AND ANALYSIS

A. Reference network model
A notable and unique feature of our reference model is the path selection. We assume that a network provides N paths between source and destination, while at most N optical paths are available (i.e., non-blocked) for setup. For a successful data transfer, the choice of n, n ≤ N paths in the network can be either optimal (P-OPT), or arbitrary (P-RND). An optimization goal maybe to find n shortest paths, with a minimal differential delay, or a path with acceptable level of physical impairments. To this end, offline tools are necessary to calculate paths, such as IETF Path Computation Element (PCE). In absence of optimization tools, any available path can be chosen for simplicity; however, optical networks are not suitable for random path selection, due to physical impairments. We claim that LNC can enable random optical path selection, and make optical routing more practical, since any impairments resulting in packet or frame losses, can be compensated with the proper set of coding parameters. We study here both methods, random and optimal, and evaluate the benefits of path selection for security and reliability purposes, since depending on the location of the attacked edge, different path selection strategies are likely to yield different performance.
B. Model Preliminaries
The network is represented as a directed and acyclic graph G(V, E) = G, where V and E are vertex set and edge set, respectively. The source and destination nodes are denoted as s ∈ V and d ∈ V , respectively. A distinction is made between incoming and outgoing edges of an arbitrary node v ∈ V , which are denoted as a set E in (v) and E out (v), respectively. In our model, In the proposed system, the time unit (tu) can be modeled as a discrete time based on the link capacity of the physical link and analyzed as transmission delay of one symbol. Let us assume that at time t, the incoming symbols at source node s ∈ V are generated by the processes X t (s, i) on every edge i considered as an incoming link of a node s and denoted as e i , head(e i ) = s and 1 ≤ i ≤ k (see Fig. 1 ). The incoming symbols are encoded into symbols y(e j ), 1 ≤ j ≤ n, which are described by encoding process Y t+1 (e j ) := Y t+1 (s, j), and sent out on each outgoing links e j ∈ E of a node s, tail(e j ) = s. In this model, the LNC encoder buffers incoming symbols from all incoming flows in parallel, i.e., incoming generation, and encodes the same with simple linear coding by using coding coefficients a i,ej from the finite field F 2 m . Thus, the signal carried on an outgoing link e j of source s at time t + 1 is:
The decoder at receiver starts decoding as soon as one encoded generation is complete, i.e., at least k data blocks from the same generation are received. The decoder is able to decode one generation at a time by running Gaussian elimination. After decoding, the data blocks are serialized and leave the decoding functional block in the correct order. The decoded information at time t + t δ on edge i in LNC decoder at the destination d is modeled as [10] :
, where t δ is decoding interval and b i,ej is decoding coefficients from the finite field F 2 m .
Let consider an example of a Galois field GF(7) for simplicity, with k = 2, r = 1 and n = k + r = 3. The incoming symbols are x 1 = 5 and x 2 = 2. The coding coefficients a i,ej are collected in the following coding matrix
. The encoding process can be presented as a product of row vector X 1×k and coding matrix A k×n , i.e.,
where y 1 = 5+2· 2 = 5+4 = 2, y 2 = 2· 5+3· 2 = 3+6 = 2, y 3 = 4 · 5 + 2 · 2 = 6 + 4 = 3. For successful decoding process, only two out of 3 encoded symbols are required, y j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. Let assume that symbol y 2 is damaged due to jamming attack, or optical impairments, and dropped during forward error correction process. Despite the damage, however, the generation composed of x 1 and x 2 can still be recovered as follows (x 1 x 2 ) 1 4 2 2 = (2 3) resulting in system of linear equations x 1 + 2 · x 2 = 2 and 4 · x 1 + 2 · x 2 = 3. This system of linear equations can be still solved as x 1 = 2−2·x 2 = 2+5·x 2 , while the second equation is transformed into 4 · (2 + 5 · x 2 )+2· x 2 = 3. Thus, x 2 can be found from the second equation as 1+6·x 2 +2·x 2 = 3, x 2 = 3−1 = 3+6 = 2, then x 1 = 2 + 5 · 2 = 2 + 3 = 5.
C. Optical Path Selection
We assume that a network provides at most N optical paths between source s and destination d, whereby these paths are collected in path set Ψ. At the moment of transmission request, only N out of N , N ≥ N , paths are available. All N existing optical paths in G(V, E) are arranged in the sorted vector
with related probabilities, that any path P l (s, d), l = 0, ..., N − 1, between source and destination is available for transmission, and related end-toend delays d l , whereby vector #» d is sorted in the ascending order so that the shortest path is indexed by l = 0. Here, P l and d l describes the same path P l (s, d), l = 0, ..., N − 1. Generally, only ξ = n, ξ ≤ N and ξ ≤ |E out (s)| optical paths are required for transmission, out of N ≤ N available paths. Given the paths available, every intermediate node v can forward m incoming data blocks from source over preconfigured set of |E out (v)| ≥ m available outgoing links. This is feasible, when the min-cut between source s and destination d in G(V, E) is at least ξ = n, min cut{s, d} ≥ n, so that the set of all available parallel paths Ψ N ⊂ Ψ in G(V, E) is larger than or equal to the number of encoded flows, n.
As previously mentioned, paths can be chosen from the set of all available paths in either arbitrary fashion, or, as it is more commonly the case, according to an optimization objective, for instance to minimize the delay. We refer to these two methods as P-RND and P-OPT, respectively. To calculate the probabilities that a certain path, and a set of paths, is chosen for transmission, let us now assume that there is a collection, or a super-set A, which contains a = C(|Φ|, γ) := |Φ| γ path sets A α , 1 ≤ α ≤ a, while Φ can be a collection of all existing paths Ψ or a collection of available paths Ψ N , i.e., Φ := Ψ, |Φ| = N or Φ := Ψ N , |Φ| = N , and γ can be a number of available paths N or the number of required for transmission paths ξ, i.e., γ := N or γ := ξ. Thus, each set A α consists of γ elements. In contrast, set
th set of remaining |Φ| − |A α | elements, which are not in the α th combination A α . Thus, the probability P (α, γ, Φ), that γ out of |Φ| paths from set A α and not from set B α are selected, is defined as
, whereby the probabilities P l,i (α) and P l,t (α) are probabilities of a path P l (s, d), l = 1, 2, ..., N , which are collected in A α and B α , respectively, to be available, while indexes i and t show the sequence number of a path P l (s, d) in the α th paths combination from A and B, i.e., A α and B α , respectively.
As a result, the network provides N = j parallel available paths with probabilityP (N = j, Φ) defined as followŝ
, where the α th set from the collection A contains all |Φ| j path combinations of N = j available paths with related probabilities described by vector #» P .
In case of N < ξ available paths, the transmission request will be blocked with probability P B (ξ, Φ), i.e.,
To find a set of optimal paths (P-OPT) with respect to minimum end-to-end delay, we arrange all N available paths from each out of a = 
Since we assume that all C(N, ξ) path combinations have the same probability to be selected for transmission from all N available paths, the probability of an arbitrary paths combination is defined as 
D. Security Analysis
2) Amount of data blocks attacked:
When at most w edges e v v ∈ E, with capacity c e v v each, are wiretapped, i.e.,
w , the number of wiretap paths y w is defined as a number of wiretap links utilized for transmission in a certain path combination. On the other hand, the probability that the wiretap paths are utilized for transmission depends on path availability #» P , i.e., the probability that a wiretap paths are available at the moment of transmission request. Moreover, the expected number of utilized wiretap pathsȲ is a function of an occurrence probability of a certain set of available paths, which has a certain size N , and the final path selection of ξ = n paths for data transmission, whereby some of them can be wiretap paths. We define the number of wiretap paths y w in a known, α th , path combination A α utilized for transmission as
, where ξ is the number of paths in each path combination A α utilized for transmission. A wiretapper can gain only one informative data block from each path regardless of the number of wiretap links belonging to this path, e.g., path P l (s, d) consists of links e vivi+1 , e vi+1vi+2 and e vi+2vi+3 , which transmit the same sub-flow of encoded symbols y 1 from each encoded generation, while links e vivi+1 and e vi+2vi+3 are wiretapped and attacker can wiretap from both links the same symbols y 1 from each encoded generation. Thus, each path P l (s, d) can be considered only once as wiretap path in selected set A α . To constraint that, we define a function
In case of optimal path selection, i.e., P-OPT, the wiretap path P l (s, d), 0 ≤ l < ξ − 1, is utilized, when it is available, i.e., P l (s, d) ∈ Ψ N , and sorted in delay vector
the number of utilized wiretap paths is defined as follows
, where C(N , j) = N j defines the number of all possible combinations of N = j available paths, while the probability of α th combination, which consists of N = j available paths, P (α, j, Ψ), can be determined by Eq. (3). Since transmission is only successful, if there are enough available paths, i.e., ξ ≤ N , we only consider combinations of j ≥ ξ available paths, which occur with probability (1−P B (ξ, Ψ)), see Eq. (5).
In case of random path selection, i.e., P-RND, ξ arbitrary available paths can be utilized for transmission, whereby any ξ paths out of N existing paths can be selected with equal probability, if these ξ paths are available with probabilitŷ P (N = ξ, Ψ) . Thus, the expected number of utilized wiretap pathsȲ rnd isȲ
, where y w (β, ξ), P (β, ξ, Ψ) andP (N = ξ, Ψ) are determined by Eqs. (6), (3) and (4), respectively.
To transmit all M data blocks from the same secret data, the source utilizes ξ = n parallel reserved paths. (s, d) . As a result, the total number of wiretap data blocks Λ(y) is
, where y describes the number of wiretap paths utilized for transmission and, depending on path selection method and security attack, can be found by Eqs. (6), (9) or (10), i.e., y := y w (α, ξ) or y :=Ȳ opt or y :=Ȳ rnd . To protect against jamming attacks, we propose to send over r additional paths r = Λ(y) additional redundant data blocks generated at the source. To evaluate the ability of an attacker to recover or to disrupt a complete generation, we define the expected number of attacked data blocks from the same generations as
, where k is a number of data blocks required for successful decoding at destination.
To analyze the impact of path selection on security, let us consider the worst case scenario, where there is only one wiretap edge in the network, but most of the paths allocated to transmission go over it, thus leading to what we refer to as catastrophic security threat. As a measure of catastrophic security threat, we define two probabilities related to eavesdropping and jamming attacks. For eavesdropping, we evaluate the probability that a wiretapper is able to receive over one wiretap edge e v v ∈ W E w at least ν = k LNC encoded data blocks from each generation and to encode the whole secret data. In case of jamming attacks, the wiretapper should be able to disrupt at least ν = r + 1 data blocks from each generation transmitted over edge e v v ∈ W J w and, thus, to prevent successful decoding at the destination. In other words, the secret data can experience a catastrophic security threat, when ν utilized parallel path are established over the same wiretap edge e v v . The probability of catastrophic security threat Θ opt (ν, ξ) in case of P-OPT over ξ parallel paths is
, where function X(α, ν, ξ) described by Eq. (14) is a logical function, which defines a valid for analysis path combinations, i.e., the path sets utilized for transmission, where at least ν paths are wiretap paths.
Finally, the probability of catastrophic security threat Θ rnd (ν, ξ) in case of P-RND transmission method over ξ randomly selected paths is defined as
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION We now show the theoretical results and validate the same by simulations. The data blocks for both path selection methods, i.e., P-RND and P-OPT, have the same size of 80 byte and the secret data was composed of 20 data blocks. The LNC process was implemented over finite field F 2 8 with symbol size of 8 bits. The transmission rate of each optical link was set to 10 Gbps. The traffic load was set to 1 data block per time unit per lane, and the network is lossless. The normalized confidence intervals show 95% confidence and small values, and are not shown for clarity of presentation.
For the simulations and analysis, we use the NSFnet topology (Fig. 2) . Here, there are in total N = 18 different possible parallel wavelength paths (see Table I ), while 16 parallel paths can be allocated from the example source node 0 to the destination node 5. The numbers on the edges are used to denote the amount of parallel directed links allocated. All paths are sorted in the ascending order according to the path length, i.e., end-to-end delays, i.e., number of hops, and described by vector #» d = {2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Moreover, the parallel paths have different probabilities to be available at the moment of transmission request. For the sake of the analysis, we assumed that these probabilities decrease with increasing path length, i.e., #» P = {0.8, 0.79, 0.78, 0.77, 0.70, 0.69, 0.60, 0.59, 0.58, 0.57, 0.56, 0.55, 0.54, 0.53, 0.50, 0.45, 0.40, 0.35}. In the case of P-RND, ξ = n out of N ≤ N available parallel paths are selected randomly. In the case of P-OPT, the data flows are sent in parallel over ξ optimized (shortest) parallel paths. We assume that an attacker has access to three edges, i.e., e v v ∈ {2−5, 8−9, 12−13} (dashed edges), and can perform different types of security attacks simultaneously, at different time points, and in different combinations. Since our model directly depends on two main parameters, i.e., (i) a steady state path availability, which depends on topology and network capabilities, and (ii) the path selection method, we validate the analysis by using dynamic Monte-Carlo-simulations with these parameters, and instead of event simulations, for efficiency. Fig. 3 shows the amount of eavesdropped data units per generation, Λ(y)/M , on a sample wiretap edge. Here, the transmission was implemented without redundancy over ξ = k parallel paths, while the generation size was set to k = 4 and k = 8. In the P-OPT case with 4 and 8 parallel paths, most of the data blocks could be wiretapped on the edge e 2,5 , around 95% and 57%, respectively. This edge is a high capacity edge (high number of parallel links, i.e., c e2,5 = 6) and belongs to the shortest paths between source and destination, i.e., paths P l (0, 5), 0 ≤ l ≤ 5. In contrast, the amount of eavesdropped data blocks on other wiretap edges, belonging to the longer paths, is much smaller and increases with a number of parallel paths ξ = k allocated. In the case of P-RND, the data blocks are distributed more uniformly over the whole network, and, hence, also over the wiretap edges. As a result, the impact of k on the amount of wiretap data is not very significant, however the amount of eavesdropped data blocks on the edges that belong to longer paths slightly increases with increasing k. The simulations are close to analytical results calculated with Eqs. (9), (10) and (11). Fig. 4 shows a more detailed security analysis with respect to two specific wiretap edges, e 2,5 and e 8, 9 , chosen since they could deliver the largest amount of data blocks to a wiretapper. Here, the amount of eavesdropped data blocks from the same generations Λ * (y) is presented as a function of a number of redundant data blocks, r, and generation size, k. Generally, the amount of eavesdropped data blocks increases with increasing r. In the case of P-OPT with k = 4, the wiretapper is able to receive the complete generation on edge e 2,5 and to successfully decode it, when at least one redundant data block is generated and sent over an additional path. That is due to the fact that edge e 2,5 is on all possible shortest (optimal) paths established. In contrast, edge e 8, 9 , which is primarily on the longest paths, can provide at most 48.6% of data blocks from the same generation when r = 3. On the other hand, the P-RND disperses the secret data randomly over all edges in the network so that the amount of wiretapped data blocks is lesser on edges belonging to the shorter paths, e.g., at most 84.8% on the edge e 2,5 and transmission over ξ = k + r = 4 + 3, and the amount of wiretap data on edges belonging to longer paths is larger, e.g., 55% on the edge e 8, 9 for the same ξ = k + r = 4 + 3, compared to P-OPT. Also here, the simulation results match the analysis (see Eqs. (9), (10), (12)).
Next, we generate different combinations of wiretap edges, e i ∈ {2 − 5, 8 − 9, 12 − 13}, where only one, two, or all three edges are attacked at the same time, i.e., w ∈ {1, 2, 3} and collection W consists of 3, 3 and 1 elements, respectively. The results in Fig. 5 present the mean number of eavesdropped data blocks from the same generation and the jamming success, which were calculated over all possible combinations from W. We show both the probability that a wiretapper is able to recover a generation and, as a result, the entire secret data, as well as the probability of the jamming success. We assume the jamming was successful, if an attacker disrupted more than r data blocks from the same generation and the receiver is not able to decode. The amount of eavesdropped data units in the case of P-RND is much lower then in the case of P-OPT for any k, when the number of redundant data blocks and, thus, number of utilized parallel paths is small, i.e., 0 ≤ r < 3. For a larger redundancy (r = 3), P-OPT selects more shortest paths from a pool of non-wiretap paths, e.g., path {0 − 1 − 3 − 4 − 5} in Fig. 2 , and thus exhibits better performance. At the same time, P-RND distributes all data blocks nearly uniformly over all edges and thus utilizes all wiretap edges. Here, the number of eavesdropped data blocks from the same generation Λ * (y) increases with increasing number of wiretap edges w. The attacker can recover each generation by wiretapping of at least 2 edges in the network, when ξ = 4 + 3 paths are used. Overall, the amount of eavesdropped data units from the same generation and, thus, the probability that an attacker can recover the generation decreases with increasing generation size k. The jamming attacks were not successful, when the attacker had access to one edge only and redundant data blocks were sent, r = 1 or r = 3, however the initial generation size k was small, i.e., k = 4 (Fig. 5) . In this case, 66.4% and 69.6% of generations sent could not be decoded at destination, when P-RND was utilized and r = 1 and r = 3 were sent, respectively. The increase in k, in number of redundancy or in number of simultaneously wiretapped edges increased the probability for a jamming success up to 100%. Note, that in all presented results, we consider the worst case scenario, in which wiretap edges have the largest available capacity and are selected with highest probability.
Finally, we evaluate the probability of catastrophic security threat. Here, we assume that the wiretap edge is the edge with the largest capacity utilized to establish the shortest (optimal) paths between source and destination, i.e., edge e 2,5 . Fig. 6 shows the probability that an attacker can recover or disrupt the whole secret data by accessing edge e 2,5 , where the y-axises on the left and on the right sides show the results for a successful jamming and eavesdropping attack, respectively. The eavesdropping attack was then successful, when the generation size k was small, i.e., k = 4. For P-OPT, the probability for catastrophic security threat for eavesdropping slightly increased with r from 84% to 92% for r = 0 and r = 6, respectively. For P-RND, the probability for catastrophic eavesdropping increased from 5% to 83% with an increasing r. In contrast, the attacker gained no knowledge about secret data regardless of path selection method and amount of redundancy, when the generation size was set to k = 8, i.e., Θ opt (8, 8 + r) = Θ rnd (8, 8 + r) = 0. On the other hand, an attacker could disrupt the complete secret data, where no or only one redundant data block was generated to protect each generation, when k = 8. The increase in redundant data blocks and an decrease in generation size k decreases the probability for catastrophic jamming threat. P-RND with k = 4 shows the best performance against jamming attacks, while the probability for catastrophic jamming threat could be decreased up to 0% for all transmission methods and all values of k, when r = 6 redundant data blocks were generated. In contrast to probability for catastrophic jamming threat, the probability for catastrophic eavesdropping threat increases with increasing amount of redundancy. However, there is a trade-off for both methods, P-RND and P-OPT, when an attacker simultaneously performs eavesdropping and jamming on the same edge, whereby the risk of catastrophic security threat for both attacks could be balanced out for each transmission method. For instance, when initial generation size and redundancies were set to k = 4 and r = 3 data blocks, respectively, the probabilities for catastrophic jamming and eavesdropping threat showed equal values of 46% and 84% for P-RND and P-OPT, respectively. For k = 8, r = 6 redundant data blocks are required to minimize the risk of successful eavesdropping and jamming attacks, whereby the probability for catastrophic jamming and eavesdropping threat can be eliminated.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the effectiveness of LNC to balance reliable transmission and security in optical networks. To this end, we combined the coding process with parallelization of the source data stream. We proposed and compared two WDM path selection methods: 1) optimized (shortest) paths, and 2) randomly selected paths. We analyzed and compared both the security capabilities against eavesdropping attacks, and reliability against jamming attacks. The results showed that LNC and parallel transmission over randomly selected paths significantly increases security against both eavesdropping and jamming compared with conventional WDM transmission, especially in the case, when a wiretapper has access to the shortest paths between source and destination. The combination of LNC and random path selection requires smaller number of redundancies to prevent jamming attacks. Finally, we showed that in absence of physical layer security measures, conventional WDM transmission can lead to a catastrophic security threat, whereby an attacker can eavesdrop or to disrupt a whole secret data by accessing only one edge in a network. For every scenario, there exist a system setting, which allows to reach a minimal success probability for both eavesdropping and jamming attacks.
